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According to expert estimation, 33% of informal sector of Ukrainian economy is shaped by 
piracy. Special 301 reports on copyright protection argue that Ukraine has serious problems with legal 
regulation of copyright protection. The U.S. federal government suspended the duty-free treatment of 
Ukrainian goods on December 22, 2017. The main cause of the act was inadequate copyright protection 
policy in Ukraine. This kind of policy provides favorable context for digital piracy, especially Inter- net 
piracy – using the Internet as a tool for illegal consumption of different types of goods (books, music 
etc.). The research paper deals with internet piracy in Ukraine. Following analysis is based on theory of 
rational choice with particular attention to the Becker model and James S. Coleman‟s conception of 
micro-to-macro transitions. The principle of utility maximization is a core element of the theory. 
According to G. Becker, person becomes “criminal” (pirate, in this case) “not because their basic 
motivation is differ from that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs differ”. The paper 
focuses on the case of pirate Telegram channel “The Book Depository in Ukrainian” (2035 followers). 
Pirates donated some money for one print copy of a book, bought it, after that they scanned it and made 
available in the channel for free. All followers of the channel who donated as well as who did not, got 
an access for the e-copy. The author explores socio-structural preconditions of internet piracy, negative 
externalities and provides optimal condition for normative regulation and penalty. From the economic 
point of view, the optimal regulatory strategy will stultify internet piracy. Negative externalities were 
calculated according to the “loss function” that was provided by G. Becker for crime (3. 946. 240 
UAH). The existing regulatory strategy is not optimal. The formal model for optimal fine (ƒ ́ ́) is 
ƒ ́ ́=(3*Y)*N, where Y – “income” of pirate after crime, N – number of pirates in the network. 
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